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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, as amended 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless 
specifically provided, shall be construed as 
an admission or denial of liability or 
responsibility insofar as governmental 
entities or their employees are concerned. If 
immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted and liability 
of the entity shall be determined as if the 
entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed as adversely affecting any immunity 
from suit which a governmental entity or 
employee may otherwise assert under state or 
federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an act 
or omission which occurs during the 
-iii-
performance of such employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority isr after the effective date of this 
act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject 
matter against the employee or the estate of 
the employee whose act or omission gave rise 
to the claim, unless the employee acted or 
failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or omission 
complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no 
employee may be held personally liable for 
acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud 
or malice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j), as amended 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: ... 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county, or city 
jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD DEAN LANCASTER, * 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 86-0266 
vs. s 
UTAH STATE PRISON, et al.f : Priority No. 14 
Defendants-Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF TBE CASE 
Plaintiff's complaint, alleging that he was injured due 
to the negligence and gross negligence of these defendants, was 
dismissed pursuant to the state defendants' motion to dismiss, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. The only 
remaining defendant, Savogran Company, was never served in this 
action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, an inmate lawfully incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison, alleges that he was injured in a fire that 
occurred at the Utah State Prison on May 21, 1984. Complaint at 
para. 7 and 8. 
2. Plaintiff alleged that the state defendants (Utah 
State Prison, Eldon Barnes, Robert Steele, Betty Johnson and Dale 
Johnson) had been grossly negligent in their conduct and that such 
conduct was the proximate cause of the fire that injured the 
plaintiff. Complaint at para. 8-10. 
3. The Defendant Savogran Company was never served 
summons in this matter. The only defendants served were the above 
named state defendants. 
4. State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 
January 21f 1986. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
accompanying Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
5. Plaintiffr through counsel, filed an objection with 
accompanying memorandum in opposition to the State Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. Objection to State Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to 
State Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
6. At a hearing, before Judge Rigtrup, on April 28, 
1986, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was argued and 
granted. Judge Rigtrup ordered that Defendants Utah State Prison, 
Eldon Barnes, Robert Steele, Betty Johnson and Dale Johnson be 
dismissed with prejudice. Order of Judge Kenneth Rigtrup dated 
May 9, 1986. 
7. Because all defendants that had been served summons 
in this action had been dismissed, the Order of May 9, 1986 
effectively dismissed this action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The only issue on appeal raised by the plaintiff was not 
before the trial court. In his appeal the plaintiff has not 
addressed the merits of the lower court's decision to dismiss his 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In his 
docketing statement and appellate brief, the plaintiff's only 
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allegation is that the dismissal below of this action was the 
fruit of a conspiracy between his private attorney, the judge and 
defendants' counsel. Such a claim was never presented to the 
court below. No evidence or record has been made concerning this 
claim. This Court should not address this issue of conspiracy but 
should dismiss the appeal, leaving the plaintiff free to bring a 
separate action if he so desires against the alleged conspirators. 
The plaintiff seeks, in his complaint, damages from the 
State of Utah and individual state officers for injuries he 
received in a fire at the Utah State Prison where the plaintiff is 
lawfully incarcerated. The State of Utah has retained immunity 
for injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in a 
state prison. The State of Utah cannot be sued by the plaintiff 
on this cause of action and the lower court correctly dismissed 
this action as to the State of Utah and the Utah State Prison. 
The individual state officers are entitled to a 
statutory immunity unless they acted with fraud or malice. The 
plaintiff at no time has alleged either fraud or malice, but only 
negligence and gross negligence. Construing the well plead 
allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for 
fraud or malice against the individual state officers and the 
lower court correctly dismissed this action as these defendants. 
-'*-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF NEVER RAISED THE ISSUE OF A 
CONSPIRACY IN THE TRIAL COURT AND CANNOT RAISE 
THE ISSUE NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ON APPEAL 
In his Appellate Brief, the plaintiff for the first time 
seeks to present a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive the 
plaintiff of his constitutional rights. In his Brief, the 
plaintiff alleges now that the plaintiff's own attorney, Mr, David 
T. Berry, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup and the state defendants' 
attorney, Brent A. Burnett joined with the named state defendants 
in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff "of his property and 
liberty interest rights to have his civil complaint heard and 
argued in a state court of law.M Appellants Brief at pp. 4-5. 
At no time was this issue presented to the trial court. 
It is clearly established law that claims not raised by the 
parties in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time 
on appeal. Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 P.2d 448 (Utah 1985); 
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984); L & M Corp. v. 
Loader, 688 P.2d 448 (Utah 1984); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 
372 (Utah 1984); Allred v. Smith, 674 P.2d 99 (Utah 1983). The 
rationale for this rule of law was explained by this Court in 
Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 
399 (1970). 
The contention relating to strict liability is 
an attempt to inject that doctrine into this 
case for the first time on appeal. It was 
dealt with neither in the plaintiff's 
complaint, nor in the pretrial conference, nor 
at trial. It is therefore not appropriate to 
address such a contention to this court. 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the 
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final settlement of controversies, requires 
that a party must present his entire case and 
his theory or theories of recovery to the 
trial court; and having done so, he cannot 
thereafter change to some different theory and 
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation. 
Id at 401. 
Not only does the plaintiff raise a new issue on appeal, 
but he also would add three new defendants. The question of a 
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his day in court was not 
raised in the trial court at all. No such claim was presented 
before it was raised for the first time on appeal. Such a claim 
cannot now be considered by this Court. 
In Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983), 
this Court held that allegations of fraud and illegality first 
presented on appeal would not be considered. In Park City Utah 
Corporation v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978) this 
Court refused to reach a claim that a stipulation below had been 
entered into by the defendant's attorney without the approval or 
authorization of the defendant. Because the issue had not been 
addressed at any time before the trial court, this Court held that 
it could not consider the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Plaintiff's newly raised claim that his own attorney was 
part of a conspiracy against the plaintiff falls within this rule 
of law. Such a claim cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. If plaintiff desires, he may file a separate action 
against those individuals he has proof have conspired to deny him 
his constitutional rights. The instant appeal is not the 
appropriate time or manner in which to present this new cause of 
action. This Court is not equipped to inquire into such a claim. 
-*-
To adjudicate this claim would require the taking of evidence, the 
permitting of discovery? in short, it would require a trial court. 
Because the only claim raised by the plaintiff on appeal is that 
he has been the victim of a conspiracy, and he does not pursue the 
original subject matter of the instant action, this appeal should 
be dismissed and the plaintiff left free to bring a separate 
action if he so desires concerning the allegation of a conspiracy. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH STATE PRISON IS IMMUNE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW PURSUANT TO §63-30-10(1)(j) UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED 
Plaintiff, on the day of the alleged accident, was an 
inmate of the Utah State Prison. All of the complained of actions 
occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act expressly retains the 
State of Utah, and its agencies, immunity for any injury which 
"arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison 
...*. §63-30-10(1)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended; previously 
numbered as §63-30-10(10). 
In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), plaintiffs 
sued the State of Utah for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's 
decedent, a prison inmate. The decedent died during surgery at 
the Utah State Prison which plaintiffs alleged had been 
negligently performed. Affirming the dismissal of the State and 
the Prison from the lawsuit, the Supreme Court of Utah relied upon 
§63-30-10(10) Utah Code Ann. 1953, and explained. 
-6-
The plain meaning of the section reflects a 
legislative intent to retain sovereign 
immunity for any injuries occurring while the 
incarcerated person is in prison and under the 
control of the State. Since this injury 
occurred while Madsen was under the control of 
prison officials, the governmental entities, 
viz., the State of Utah and the Board of 
Corrections, are both immune from liability. 
583 P.2d at 93. 
In Schmitt v. Billings, Utah, 600 P.2d 516 (1979), the 
Court expressly held that the arising out of incarceration 
exception applied to an inmate's claim that the Prison and its 
employees had lost or damaged his property. In Schmitt, the 
plaintiff had alleged that certain of his personal property, while 
in the possession of Prison employees, was lost. The Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the action as to the State of Utah, the 
Utah State Prison, the Division of Corrections and the Department 
of Social Services based on the legislative intent to retain 
immunity for governmental entities for any injuries occurring 
while the incarcerated person is in prison and under the control 
of the State. 
The statute has not been changed, only renumbered. The 
State of Utah and the Utah State Prison cannot be held liable in 
the instant lawsuit, just as they could not be in Madsen v. State, 
or Schmitt v, Billings, supra. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT STATE 
EMPLOYEES 
The plaintiff alleges that the individual defendant 
state employees acted with gross negligence and, alternatively, 
that they should be held strictly liable for the injuries 
allegedly sustained by the plaintiff. No allegation of fraud or 
malice was made against these defendants in the complaint. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act contains a statutory 
official immunity. §63-30-4 Utah Code Ann. 1953r as amended. The 
fourth paragraph of §63-30-4, states: 
An employee may be joined in an action against 
a governmental entity in a representative 
capacity if the act or omission complained of 
is one for which the governmental entity may 
be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the 
employees duties, within the scope of 
employment or under color of authority, unless 
it is established that the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
This statutory immunity was before this Court in Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). Borthick, involved 
allegations that the defendant state employee had negligently 
caused plaintiff's fiscal losses. In Borthick, the Court first 
determined that the State of Utah, also a defendant, was immune. 
This Court then held: 
The second quoted paragraph of §63-30-4 
reaffirms that the employee will not be 
personally liable unless he or she acted or 
failed to act due to gross negligence, fraud, 
or malice. The second paragraph also 
authorizes the employee to be joined in a 
representative capacity in an action against 
the governmental entity, but only where the 
act or omission Mis one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable* under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. In other words, 
the governmental official or employee can only 
be sued in a representative capacity when the 
governmental entity is liable. 
The application of §63-30-4 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, as amended in 1978, 
to the liability of defendant Borthick is 
clear. He cannot be sued in his 
representative capacity because the state is 
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not liable ... He cannot be sued in his 
personal capacity because §63-30-4 precludes 
personal liability of a government employee 
for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of his dutiesr unless the employee 
••acted or failed to act through gross 
negligence, fraud or malice.11 Since 
plaintiff's complaint makes no such 
allegations, its dismissal as to defendant 
Borthick was proper. 
658 P.2d at 633. 
In the instant action the State of Utah and the Utah 
State Prison are immune, as in Borthick. Since Borthickf the 
Legislature amended the statute by removing 'gross negligence'. 
In the instant lawsuit, no allegation of fraud or malice has been 
made such as would permit the plaintiff to recover from the 
defendant. At no time did the plaintiff seek to amend his 
complaint so as to allege fraud or malice. As in Borthick, the 
instant claim should be dismissed. 
Even if the plaintiff were to have amended his complaint 
so as to allege fraud and malice; the allegations of the complaint 
show affirmatively that no such mental state existed. There are 
no facts to show 'fraud' in this action. 'Malice' is defined as; 
The intentional doing of a wrongful act 
without just cause or excuse, with an intent 
to inflict an injury or under circumstances 
that the law will imply an evil intent. A 
condition of mind which prompts a person to do 
a wrongful act willfully, that is, on purpose, 
to the injury of another, or to do 
intentionally a wrongful act toward another 
without justification or excuse. ... 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 862. 
Malice implies an intentional act. Negligence is not 
sufficient to find that an act was done maliciously. When 
originally passed, S63-30-4 included liability of state employees 
for gross negligence, fraud and malice. To interpret the word 
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malice to mean anything other than an intentional act would be to 
make the use of 'gross negligence' in the statute meaningless. 
"Malice in law requires the willful doing of an 
injurious wrongdoing of the part of Pentagon.11 Breuleux v. 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union. 460 N.E.2d 306,309 (Ohio App. 
1983), The complaint failed to show any wrongdoing by the 
defendants that could even arguably rise to the level of malice. 
At most, the complaint might be read so as to support a 
finding of gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined as: 
The intentional failure to perform a manifest 
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences 
as affecting the life or property of another. 
It is materially more want of care than 
constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act 
or omission respecting legal duty of an 
aggravated character as distinguished from a 
mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is 
very great negligencef or the absence of 
slight diligence, or the want of even scant 
care. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.r p. 931-932. 
In the recent case of Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) , this Court accepted this 
definition of gross negligence. 
"Gross negligence is the failure to observe 
even slight care; it is carelessness or 
recklessness to a degree that shows utter 
indifference to the consequences that may 
result." Robinson Insurance and Real Estate# 
Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.f 366 
F.Supp. 307f 311 (W.D.Ark. 1973). Willful 
misconduct goes beyond gross negligence in 
that a defendant must be aware that his 
conduct will probably result in injury. 
Id. at 335. 
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state any facts or 
allegations upon which a finding of fraud or malice could be 
predicated. There is no claim that the defendants actively sought 
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to injure the plaintiff. There is no allegation that the 
defendants in any manner showed malice to the plaintiff, nor did 
they commit a fraud of any kind* At most, the allegations of the 
complaint when read most favorably to the plaintiff would show 
that the defendants acted with a degree of carelessness and 
indifference to the consequences of their actions that would 
constitute gross negligence as that term has been defined by this 
Court. Under these circumstancesf the plaintiff, having alleged 
nothing greater than gross negligence for which the defendants are 
immuner has failed to state a cause of action against the 
individual defendants and his complaint was correctly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the dismissal of the 
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED this /S' day of November, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Human Resources Division 
If 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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